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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily 
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  On appeal, Mr. Wilson contends that 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with 
regard to four of Mr. Wilson’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues 
of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective.  The underlying criminal cases, in 
which Mr. Wilson had been charged with two counts related to his sex offender 
registration and two counts of lewd conduct, had been consolidated for trial.  One 
incident of lewd conduct was alleged to have occurred in a car while Mr. Wilson was 
driving from Twin Falls to Emmett, Idaho, and one incident of lewd conduct purportedly 
occurred in Mr. Wilson’s house in Emmett. 
The Petition was dismissed despite the fact that the district court found trial 
counsel’s strategy to join the unrelated cases for trial was based on ignorance.  Further, 
Mr. Wilson submitted affidavits and evidence to demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness 
in failing to call any witnesses or introduce any evidence which was available and which 
would have cast further doubt on the victim’s credibility and/or shown the events as the 
State’s witnesses described them were improbable.  Mr. Wilson submitted affidavits 
showing one available witness would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not living at the 
house in Emmett during the relevant time period and one witness would have testified 
that he was usually in the car with Mr. Wilson when he drove to Twin Falls.  Therefore, 
the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these four claims.   
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 27, 2011, Jered Wilson was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct, 
one count of failure to register, and one count of failure to provide notice of change of 
address to another state.  (R., p.4.)  On the lewd conduct charges, Mr. Wilson was 
sentenced to life, with ten years fixed.  (Trial Tr., p.481, Ls.16-19.)1  Mr. Wilson was 
sentenced to a fixed term of ten years on the two registration offenses.  (Trial Tr., p.482, 
L.22 – p.483, L.13.)  Mr. Wilson appealed from the judgment.  (R., p.5.)  On appeal, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Wilson’s conviction for failure to provide notice of 
change of address to another state.  (Idaho v. Jered Josiah Wilson, Dt. No. 39073, 2013 
Unpublished Opinion No. 581, Idaho Court of Appeals, July 12, 2013; R., p.5.)     
On July 21, 2014, Mr. Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for:  (1) failing to move to change venue; (2) failing to 
give an opening statement; (3) failing to seek to admit medical records, driving records 
and employment records for use as rebuttal evidence; (4) failing to interview witnesses 
who had exculpatory evidence and even one potential witness who said the victim 
recanted her statements about lewd conduct; (5) failing to interview the victim prior to 
trial; (6) failing to retain expert witnesses to testify as to petitioner’s driving status, and a 
forensic psychologist to examine the reliability of the complaining witness’s identification 
of the petitioner; (7) failing to protect petitioner’s speedy trial right; (8) failing to interview 
victim’s older brother who was removed from the home for prior sexual abuse; (9) failing  
                                            
1 The district court in Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction case took judicial notice of the trial 
transcript.  (Addendum to Record on Appeal (“Supp. R.”), pp.32-33.)  For ease of 
reference, Mr. Wilson shall refer to the transcript of the March 1-2, 2011 trial, as well as 
the included pre- and post-trial hearings from the underlying criminal case, as “Trial Tr.” 
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to seek funds for an investigator which would have resulted in defense counsel 
presenting a copy of the petitioner’s medical report, employment record, utility bills as to 
his residence, the victim’s brother’s stay at the Patriot Center and witnesses to testify as 
to why he was there, and to interview defense witnesses; (10) failing to alert the district 
court of threats of filing a persistent violator sentencing enhancement made by the 
prosecutor should petitioner testify; (11) failing to present a complete 
defense/abandonment of petitioner’s only defense where petitioner asked for cases to 
be tried separately but defense counsel said no, and also failed to mount any defense 
or present any case; and (12) failing to notify petitioner of his re-sentencing or ensure 
petitioner was present at his re-sentencing hearing in July of 2013.  (R., pp.3-71.)  
Petitioner also alleged his due process rights were violated because he was denied his 
right to testify at trial, the venue was incorrect, and he was denied his right to a speedy 
trial.  (R., pp.7, 10.)  Petitioner also asserted that a conflict of interest existed between 
him and his counsel which resulted in petitioner being tried without counsel.    (R., p.7.)   
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal in which the State addressed 
each of Mr. Wilson’s claims.  (R., pp.72-162.)  In its motion for summary dismissal, the 
State asserted that, while “[t]he Petitioner offers affidavits of potential witnesses and 
some medical reports and he alleges that these should have been used or investigated 
further by his defense counsel,” Mr. Wilson did “not provide admissible evidence for 
these or his other claims.”  (R., pp.75-76.)  The State conceded that the information he 
presented “may raise some questions of fact” but reasoned that the questions of fact did 
“not raise ‘genuine issues of material facts’ entitling him to an evidentiary hearing.”  
(R., p.76.)   The State claimed that the affidavits and medical documents did not 
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establish a solid alibi defense, or impossibility or actual innocence and further, that 
Mr. Wilson did not show that if offered, the outcome in his case would have been 
different.  (R., p.76.) Mr. Wilson did not file any documents in response to the motion to 
dismiss.   
Thereafter, a hearing was held on the motion for summary dismissal.  (3/23/15 
Tr.)  The district court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction petition at the hearing, 
and essentially adopted all of the arguments made by the State in its motion for 
summary dismissal.  (3/23/15 Tr.)  The district court held, “[t]he Court is going to grant 
the State’s motion for the reasons stated by the [ ] State.”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.)  
The district court further explained its reasoning regarding two of the claims—one claim 
was the consolidation of the two trials: 
Now, the only issue that I would have perhaps differed on is that initially 
Mr. Mimura wished to consolidate these two trials, because there was -- 
and I just had my little notes here.  The first trial he didn’t want there to be 
the opportunity to file a persistent violator on the failure to register charge.  
The failure to register was filed in 2009, and was the first -- was the first 
one set for trial.  Then the L and L got filed in July of 2010, and that was 
also set for trial. 
 
And Mr. Mimura was concerned that if they -- well, two reasons.  He was 
concerned about Mr. Wilson testifying at the failure to register trial, 
because apparently he’d been both in a hospital in Boise and at various 
locations in Oregon, which would have exposed him to additional charges 
for failure to register.  But they were also concerned that if the L and L trial 
went first, that he could be exposed to a persistent violator enhancement 
on the failure to register, because he would then have three prior felonies. 
 
That really was a strategy based on ignorance, because in fact, 
Mr. Wilson already had sufficient felonies that they could have filed a 
persistent violator enhancement.  And so the reason to consolidate the 
two trials to avoid that persistent violator enhancement wasn’t actually a 
legitimate trial strategy, because whether the trials were consolidated or 
not, he could have been charged with that persistent violator.   
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However, it doesn’t rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
because there then is a conversation with the prosecutor, who says look, 
even though he’s eligible, and we could file persistent violator, so long as 
the charges remain consolidated and we go to trial tomorrow, we won’t file 
it.  And at that point, then, Mr. Wilson, through his attorney, agreed to 
continue with the consolidation.  So there certainly isn’t any ineffective 
assistance of counsel in that regard.   
 
(3/23/15 Tr., p.10, L.2 – p.11, L.18.) 
The district court also provided the reason for its decision on another claim—
whether the testimony and evidence regarding Mr. Wilson’s inability to drive established 
an issue of material fact.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, L.12.)  Post-conviction counsel 
attempted to clarify that the evidence showed that Mr. Wilson originally injured his 
Achilles in October of 2005 but didn’t have surgery until 2006.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-
20, p.13, Ls.3-11.)   
The district court summarized the medical records as, “on April 16th, 2006, he 
was in a knee splint, used crutches, no weight bearing.  And then January 22, 2007, 
sprained ankle, crutches till comfortable to engage in normal activities.  Did I miss 
something?”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.)  The district court noted that “we don’t 
have anything that indicates for all of 2006 and all of 2007 he was medically prohibited 
from driving.  And similarly, we don’t have any driving record that indicates he was 
prohibited from driving all of 2006 and all of 2007.”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.)  
The court granted the motion for summary dismissal based on the State’s 
pleadings.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.) 
In its written order granting summary dismissal, the district court made no 
additional findings but incorporated the arguments the State made in its motion for 
summary dismissal:   
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The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal.  The state [sic] noted 
generally that the Petition should be dismissed because the alleged 
deficiencies of trial counsel were based on trial strategy, Petitioner failed 
to support his claims with admissible evidence and had not established 
prejudice – that the outcome of the trial would be different.  In addition, the 
State addressed each claim, providing both argument and authority for the 
various reasons the individual claim should be dismissed.  No responsive 
pleading was filed. 
 
(R., p.165.) 
Thereafter, the district court entered a final judgment.  (R., pp.168-169.) 
Mr. Wilson filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the 
petition.  (R., pp.170-175.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Wilson established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to join his two cases based on the 
erroneous belief that this strategy would prohibit the State from adding a sentencing 
enhancement.  Mr. Wilson also asserted that trial counsel failed to call several 
witnesses whose testimony would have further eroded the credibility of the victim and 
failed to introduce evidence that he could not drive for lengthy periods of time which 
would have made the possibility that the events occurred as the victim described even 
less likely.  In support of his claims, Mr. Wilson submitted evidence and several sworn 
affidavits.  Although the district court found that the trial strategy of defense counsel in 
joining the two unrelated cases was “based on ignorance,” it still summarily dismissed 
all of Mr. Wilson’s claims.  However, Mr. Wilson actually presented prima facie evidence 
of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding these issues and demonstrated a 
reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.  As such, Mr. Wilson certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary 
hearing on the four claims, and the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the 
post-conviction petition in its entirety. 
 
B. Post-Conviction Jurisprudence 
 
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying 
criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction.  Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 
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456 (1991).  It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure 
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.  Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner 
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).  However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding 
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action.  A post-conviction petition is required to 
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim;” it “must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records 
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”  Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.   
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings.  Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).  
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show 
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).  
The appellate court presumes that trial counsel was competent “and that trial tactics 
were based on sound legal strategy.”  State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 792 (1997).  Trial 
counsel's tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008). 
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
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proceedings would have been different.”  Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.  “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Id. at 686. 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
I.C. § 19-4906(c).  In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district 
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.”  Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995).  Additionally, the district court need not accept those 
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.”  Coontz v. 
State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996).  However, if the petitioner presents some 
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the 
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the 
State.  Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968).  This is so even if the allegations 
appear incredible on their face.  Id.  The district court is required to accept the 
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the petitioner’s 
conclusion.  Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.   
“A petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the 
petition has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element 
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of the claim upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  Pratt v. State, 134 
Idaho 581, 583 (2000).  Thus, a petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the 
petitioner establishes:  (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s 
performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the 
deficiency prejudiced petitioner’s case.”  Id.  A district court may summarily dismiss a 
post-conviction petition only where the petition and evidence supporting the petition fail 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would 
entitle him or her to the relief requested.  State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). 
If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted to resolve the factual issues.  Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 
(Ct. App. 2002).  The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “The inquiry performed is the threshold 
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, 
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either 
party”  Id. at 250.  If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must 
be conducted.  Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.  The underlying facts alleged by the 
petitioner “must be regarded as true” for purposes of summary dismissal.  Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009).  Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-
moving party, and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
drawn in favor of the non-moving party.”  Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
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Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law.  Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal 
order de novo.  Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Consolidating Two Cases For Trial Based On His 
Failure To Investigate Mr. Wilson’s Criminal History 
 
Mr. Wilson asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on four of his post-conviction claims.2  Mr. Wilson asserted, inter 
alia, that his trial counsel was deficient because counsel failed to reasonably investigate 
Mr. Wilson’s criminal history and that deficiency prejudiced him because it resulted in 
his cases being joined for trial, despite the risk that the jury would convict him based on 
propensity evidence, and where in fact the jury convicted him of all charged counts.   
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho 
Criminal Rules.  State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 (2007); State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 
784, 790 (Ct. App. 2007).  Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may 
                                            
2 Several of the claims alleged by Mr. Wilson in his petition were interrelated such that 
Mr. Wilson, on appeal, will address them in two parts, although the claims were 
identified as four claims in his post-conviction petition.  Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that 
his trial counsel was ineffective (iii) for failing to produce his employment records, 
medical records or driving records (R., pp.12-14); (iv) failing to interview available 
witnesses (Jered Lyle Wilson, Barbara Wilson, Jesse Wilson, and Rachel Wilson) who 
had exculpatory evidence that would have rebutted the testimony of the State’s 
witnesses, Kelly Petty and J.K.W (R., pp.15-19); (ix) failing to make reasonable 
investigation (R., pp.28-30) which would have resulted in the presentation of medical 
records, employment records, interviews of defense witnesses and information that 
Mr. Wilson shared his residence with his sister; (xi) failure to present a defense 
(R., pp.32-37) in that trial counsel did not try to separate the trials as Mr. Wilson 
requested and did not call any of Mr. Wilson’s witnesses or present evidence or 
documentation supporting his defense. 
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order two or more informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been 
joined in a single information.  I.C.R. 13.  Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same information if the offenses, “are based on the same act or transaction or on two 
(2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common 
scheme or plan.”  I.C.R. 8(a).  Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient 
nexus between them in order to be properly joined.  State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 
361-62 (Ct. App. 2003).  Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides that, “[i]f it appears that a 
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses . . . the court may order the 
state to elect between counts, grant separate trials of counts, . . . or provide whatever 
other relief justice requires.”  I.C.R. 14.  Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a 
defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as 
corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists.  State v. Wilbanks, 
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).   
 Tactical and strategic decisions by trial counsel will not be second-guessed and 
“cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382–
83, 247 P.3d 582, 609–10 (2010). In the absence of a showing that counsel was 
unprepared, ignorant of the relevant law, or exhibited any other shortcoming capable of 
objective evaluation, the reviewing court will presume that the decision was one driven 
by tactical or strategic decision making.  Crawford v. State, __ P.3d __, 2016 WL 
1358103, *5 (Idaho Apr. 6, 2016).   
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To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a 
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86 (2011). 
 Here, the district court found evidence indicating that the decision to stipulate to 
join the two cases was the product of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law.  
The district court found trial counsel’s decision to join the two cases “was a strategy 
based on ignorance” and was therefore not a legitimate trial strategy.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.10, 
L.13 – p.11, L.7.)  Although the district court found that defense counsel’s trial strategy 
to agree to consolidation was initially based on ignorance, it found that, because the 
State offered the day before trial to not file the persistent violator so long as the charges 
remained consolidated and the cases went to trial the next day, that this was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-18.)  Thus, the district court 
handling Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction found defense counsel’s strategy was 
unreasonable as it was based on ignorance, but found that it was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel because the consolidation could later be rationalized post-hoc 
due to a late agreement among the parties. 
The day before trial, trial counsel made several statements explaining why he 
agreed to consolidate the cases: 
Judge, it’s my understanding that the State’s considered trying to add the 
habitual offender on both of the cases which would expose my client to a 
mandatory minimum of five years up to actual life on all of the counts.  
Judge, obviously when we were making our determinations on having 
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these matters consolidated, it was a situation where we didn’t believe that 
my client was currently exposed to the habitual offender enhancement 
which could have been filed.   
 
Judge, last week the State discovered when they did a background check, 
because it had never previously been done, that my client has actually 
quite a few number of felony convictions here in the state of Idaho.  I 
believe that he has four felony convictions ranging from driving without 
privileges to NSF check, forgery, and burglary. 
 
Apparently, Judge, if we had known that, we may have come up with a 
different position on whether or not to consolidate these matters.  
Obviously when we were – of primary concern, trying to avoid a situation 
where the State could enhance and file the habitual. 
 
 (Trial Tr., p.25, L.10 – p.26, L.5.) 
Later, in discussions as to whether Mr. Wilson would take the stand and testify at 
his trial, defense counsel again explained that he was mistaken and would not have 
consolidated: 
Judge, when I did make the strategic move at the time to have the cases 
consolidated so that we could avoid consecutive trials because I was 
under the misimpression that that was the only way that the State – or the 
best way to prevent the State from being able to file the habitual status 
offender enhancement, I made that based on inaccurate information, 
Judge, because I wasn’t aware of my client’s criminal history.  That wasn’t 
provided to me by my client or by the State until the week before trial. 
 
Obviously, in perfect 20/20 hindsight, that probably wasn’t the decision to 
make in this case, because that does affect my client’s ability and rights to 
testify separately and still maintaining his amount of credibility here. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.379, L.18 – p.380, L.7.)   
This strategy was unreasonable and based on ignorance of his client’s criminal 
history.3  According to the May 25, 2010, Production of Discovery pleading, the State 
                                            
3 Mr. Wilson had at least three prior felony convictions, of which the district court took 
judicial notice.  (Supp. R., pp.9-10.) 
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had produced the prior criminal record of the defendant.  (R.39073, p.54.)4  Even 
supposing that the criminal history was not attached as the State represented, defense 
counsel should have advised the State that its discovery responses were incomplete.  
Instead, defense counsel proceeded to strategize based on a misapprehension, which 
resulted in a stipulation to consolidate eight months later.  (R.39073, p.341.)  Defense 
counsel had even been served with a Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Prior 
Convictions, but still did not realize that Mr. Wilson had more than one prior felony 
conviction.  (R., pp.328-329) (emphasis added).  By the time defense counsel realized 
his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to move to sever the two unrelated 
cases.  Such was a trial strategy based on ignorance.   
Even the district court that tried the cases recognized prior to trial that the State 
had not yet moved to amend to include the habitual offender, nor would the court likely 
grant such a late motion.5  (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.4-21.)  Further, the trial court pointed out 
that the only reason to proceed in this fashion would be trial strategy, as there wouldn’t 
be any reason to admit evidence about the new charge on the failure to register case.  
(Trial Tr., p.14, Ls.4-23.)  Counsel was ineffective for agreeing to the joinder that would 
only harm his client, and his last minute attempts to rationalize the decision and 
subsequent new negotiation in order to justify continuing on to trial on the joined cases 
was not reasonable trial strategy, but a strategy based on ignorance.   
 Additionally, it is not clear whether trial counsel even knew the penalties for the 
registration offenses when he formulated this strategy.  Counsel told the district court 
                                            
4 Mr. Wilson moved the Court to take judicial notice of the record on appeal in Supreme 
Court case, Dkt. No. 39073.   
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that he chose not to have consecutive trials because of the exposure to the habitual 
offender enhancement “because then all of a sudden we’d changed the registration 
case from a maximum of five years to a minimum of five years up to natural life.”  (Trial 
Tr., p.26, Ls.18-23.)  This was incorrect, and the prosecutor let the district court know 
that the maximum sentence on the failure to register charge was actually ten years per 
count.  (Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7.) 
Not only was this error of counsel unreasonable, it had an adverse effect on the 
defense.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  Failure to make himself aware of 
Mr. Wilson’s criminal history prior to altering trial strategy to join two unrelated cases—a 
move that severely prejudices a defendant in nearly every instance—is a perfect 
example of unreasonable performance demonstrating counsel’s unpreparedness.  As 
the district court found, the decision to consolidate based on ignorance was not a 
reasonable trial strategy.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.10, L.13 – p.11, L.7.)  Furthermore, Mr. Wilson 
was already facing a maximum penalty of life on the lewd conduct charge. 
Mr. Wilson asserts that he suffered unfair prejudice from the charges being tried 
together.  Mr. Wilson could not testify at his trial on the lewd conduct charges without 
opening himself up to questions on when and where he was living, whether he failed to 
register.  Mr. Wilson’s right to a fair trial was impacted due to the probability that the jury 
concluded that because he had been convicted of lewd conduct in Missouri, he was 
guilty of lewd conduct in Idaho.  The jury likely found that he was guilty of the other 
crime simply because of his criminal disposition—he is a bad person.  See State v. 
                                                                                                                                            
5 The district court judge who tried the case was not the same judge who heard the 
post-conviction petition. (3/23/15 Tr.; Trial Tr., p.31, Ls.17-18.) 
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Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002). This is precisely the evidence of prior bad 
acts that is excluded under I.R.E. 404(b).   
Defense counsel’s failure to ascertain his client’s criminal history and subsequent 
blind march forward based on such a vital blunder can be likened to the facts of 
McKay v. State.  In McKay v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court held that McKay’s trial 
attorney was objectively deficient for failing to object to jury instructions which omitted 
the only disputed element in the case, and there was “no conceivable tactical 
justification for trial counsel’s failure to object.”  148 Idaho 567, 572 (2010).  The Court 
vacated the summary dismissal of Mr. McKay’s application, finding that he had 
established a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance, thus, Mr. McKay was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  Id. 
Here, trial counsel made an enormous mistake of fact—something which could 
easily be verified or disproved by a five minute check of the Idaho Supreme Court Data 
Repository.6  Defense counsel’s strategy was fatally flawed and just plain wrong.  No 
amount of rationalizing can lead to a presumption of competence in such a situation.  
Consolidating the lewd conduct case with a failure to register case, which proof of the 
elements relied on the jury hearing evidence of a prior conviction for illicit sexual contact 
could not fall within the ambient of reasonable representation.  
The lewd conduct case suffered from a lack of evidence, in the case there was 
no direct evidence, no eyewitness other than the victim.  Further, this is a case where 
the only evidence that the crimes occurred was statements from the alleged victim that 
Mr. Wilson had inappropriate sexual contact with her, as there was no physical 
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evidence or eye witnesses to the alleged conduct.  During the trial, it was apparent that 
J.K.W. was not a very reliable witness.7  (Trial Tr., p.327, Ls.2-21, p.328, Ls.6-8, p.328, 
Ls.20-22, p.336, 3-18, p.342, L.12 – p.344, L.5, p.344, L.9 – p.345, L.17, p.348, Ls.13-
16, p.443, Ls.3-16.)  Allowing the jury to hear testimony that there was a prior sexual 
abuse conviction relating to a minor female in Missouri is tantamount to presenting 
character evidence which is normally excluded due to well-founded fears that a jury may 
find a defendant guilty based upon the idea that if he had done something before he is 
more likely to do it again, acting in conformity with his character to engage in bad acts.  
Mr. Wilson asserts that because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a he said 
she said case, that had the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been 
different. 
In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that there was a tremendous risk that 
the jury would use information of Mr. Wilson’s prior bad act as the tiebreaker in 
determining who to believe, reasoning that if Mr. Wilson had committed an act of lewd 
conduct before, he probably did this time and, therefore, J.K.W. must be telling the truth.  
   As such, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his 
criminal history prior to agreeing to join the registration charges and the lewd conduct 
charges for trial and his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the proper 
                                                                                                                                            
6 The multiple prior felony convictions occurred in Idaho.  (Supreme Court Data 
Repository, searched by name:  JERED JOSIAH WILSON.) 
7 In his closing argument, the prosecutor said, “I want to defend J[ ] for just a couple 
minutes, or ask you to think about her testimony and come to your own conclusion 
about her defense.  J[ ] didn’t lie at all.  She said that she didn’t know a lot of things, but 
she never told a lie in here.”  (Trial Tr., p.443, Ls.3-16.) 
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functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Strickland, at 686.   
 
D. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim That Defense 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call Witnesses And Put On Evidence 
 
Mr. Wilson asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  He alleged in his petition and supporting affidavit that his trial 
counsel was deficient where counsel failed to call witnesses that would have rebutted 
the victim’s testimony, and further failed to offer evidence as to Mr. Wilson’s inability to 
drive himself for vast periods of time.  These deficiencies prejudiced him because the 
jury failed to hear any testimony or evidence conflicting with or contradicting the victim’s 
story which resulted in the jury convicting him of all charged counts.   
 In a post-conviction proceeding alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the 
Petitioner must establish facts through evidence that would be admissible at a hearing.  
The application must be supported by written statements from potential witnesses who 
are able to testify as to facts within their knowledge.  Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 
617 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that, “to justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual showing based 
upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing.  It must be supported by written 
statements from witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within 
their knowledge, or must based upon otherwise verifiable information.”).   
 A determination of whether failure to interview potential witnesses constitutes a 
deficiency in representation is “judged according to the significance of the evidence the 
witness has to offer and what other sources are available to ascertain the testimony of 
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the witness.”  Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998) (quoting State v. Bingham, 
116 Idaho 415, 424 (1989)). 
Mr. Wilson asserted in his Petition that his trial counsel was ineffective because 
the defense rested without calling any witnesses or putting on any evidence. 8 
(R., pp.12-19.)  In his Petition, Mr. Wilson identified the witnesses, provided what their 
testimony would have been, stated that they were available to testify, and alleged that 
he was prejudiced by their absence at trial where such testimony would have 
impeached the testimony of several of the witnesses at trial, including J.K.W., and this 
was demonstrated by the finding of guilt against the Petitioner.  (R., pp.15-19.)  
Mr. Wilson supported his claim by attaching affidavits from the witnesses which 
described what they would have testified to, their willingness and availability to testify, 
and the fact that they were never contacted by defense counsel.  (R., pp.55-63.)  
Mr. Wilson identified four witnesses that should have testified at trial:  Jered L. Wilson, 
Barbara Wilson, Jesse Wilson, and Rachel Wilson.  (R., pp.15-18.)   
Three witnesses provided an affidavit as to what their testimony would have 
been, had Mr. Wilson’s defense counsel called them at trial.  (R., pp.55-63.)  For 
example, Mr. Wilson’s father would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not driving during 
the time period the abuse was alleged to have occurred and there was usually an adult 
present in the car with Mr. Wilson and J.K.W.  (R., pp.55-57.)  Mr. Wilson’s mother 
                                            
8 On December 17, 2010, one year before trial, the defense served, as part of a 
discovery response, a pleading which advised that the defendant may take the stand, 
and the defendant did not anticipate calling any other witnesses, however, the following 
persons may be called as possible witnesses:  Diane Wilson, Kayllyn and Everett Reed, 
Jered L. Wilson and Barbara Wilson, Michele Wilson, Francis Michaels, Matt Michaels, 
Rachel Wilson, Shelley Logston, Janet Lockhart, Christy and Mattie Dickinson 
(R.39073, pp.106-108, 335-336.) 
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would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not living at the house during the time period 
the abuse was alleged to have occurred at the house.  (R., p.59.)  One witness even 
wrote that J.K.W. had told her that Mr. Wilson “didn’t do anything and that she was 
scared of her mother.”  (R., p.63.)  Further, three witness advised the district court that 
they had tried to contact Mr. Wilson’s defense counsel to tell him what they would be 
willing to testify to at his trial.  (R., pp.55-64.)   
In its motion for summary dismissal, the State claimed that the witnesses’ 
testimony was not significant.  (R., p.83.)  The State misrepresented the anticipated 
testimony of Rachel Wilson by asserting that this potential witness was someone “to 
whom the victim would have reported to if something had occurred.”  (R., p.84.)  
However, that was not the substance of Ms. Wilson’s anticipated testimony.  The 
document signed by Ms. Wilson contained information that Rachel Wilson actually had 
spoken to the victim who had told her that the petitioner “didn’t do anything” and that 
“[J.K.W.] was scared of her mother,” presumably meaning that Mr. Wilson was actually 
innocent of the lewd conduct charges.  (R., p.63.)   
The State argued that it was the defense’s tactical decision not to call any 
witnesses because putting on such evidence would not have been persuasive as the 
defense would have had to show that there was no time during the 2006-07 visitations 
that the petitioner was capable of committing these acts.  (R., pp.85-86.)  The district 
court relied on the State’s analysis in granting the State’s motion for dismissal and 
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found that the witnesses did not establish “a solid alibi defense, or impossibility or actual 
innocence.”9  (R., p.76.)   
However, the affidavits called into question the veracity of the testimony 
presented at trial.  For example, the State’s witness J.K.W. initially testified that it was 
just she and Mr. Wilson in the car; however, the affidavit of Jered L. Wilson indicated he 
would have testified that he or another family member was usually in the car as 
Mr. Wilson had medical issues or license suspensions during this time; thus, his 
testimony of would have impeached the credibility of J.K.W.  (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.12-17; 
R., pp.55-56.)  As another example, J.K.W. testified that there were incidents of lewd 
conduct inside the house, yet the affidavit of Barbara Wilson made clear that Mr. Wilson 
was not living at the house during the relevant time period.  (Trial Tr., p.331, L.22 – 
p.333, L.19; R., p.59.)  This was a legitimate defense as to one of the lewd conduct 
charges.  Yet the jury only had the testimony of the State’s witnesses, unchallenged by 
the defense.  Due to defense counsel’s failure to put on a single witness, the jury was 
only allowed to hear and consider testimony from the prosecution without ever hearing 
other information which would have assisted the jurors in weighing the credibility of the 
State’s witnesses.  (R., p.15.)   
While it was not clear if any of these witnesses provided a complete 
alibi defense, in a case such as Mr. Wilson’s where the word of one person, the victim 
                                            
9 While one witness provided a signed statement in which she claimed to have been 
told by the alleged victim that the allegations were untrue, the document was not 
notarized or otherwise in a permissible form pursuant to I.C. § 9-1406.  See State v. 
McClure, 159 Idaho 758, __, 367 P.3d 153, 155-56 (2016).  As such, despite the fact 
that this would be beneficial to the defense for impeachment purposes, pursuant to 
Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 537 (2013) (holding that declaration was inadmissible 
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J.K.W., was the sole testimony and evidence the State had to prove its lewd conduct 
charges, any additional flaws in her version of events could erode her credibility to the 
jury.  Such a determination would be key to a defense for these charges, particularly 
where there was no physical evidence corroborating the victim’s statements.  That is, as 
discussed in Section C, the State’s case was relatively weak, in that the only direct 
evidence against Mr. Wilson was the testimony of J.K.W., who testified multiple times 
that she could not recall or remember important facts surrounding the alleged conduct, 
and who was not sure whether she had lied the day she testified at trial.  (Trial 
Tr., p.336, Ls.11-14, p.348, Ls.13-16.)10  J.K.W.’s mother testified that she had learned 
of the alleged incidents through her son, Joshua; however, her memory was deficient as 
well; she testified several times that she was “bad with dates.”  (Trial Tr., p.274, Ls.6-8, 
p.278, Ls.14-17, p.290, Ls.17-21.)  The district court should have thus held an 
evidentiary hearing where the potential defense witnesses’ had knowledge that 
undercut the State’s witnesses’ testimony.  As such, the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing the petition. 
As to Mr. Wilson’s claim that trial counsel failed to obtain employment, medical, 
and driving records (Claim No. 3), the State asserted that trial counsel cross-examined 
the victim as to the timeframe of the lewd conduct charges, who drove the vehicle for 
visitation, and whether the victim’s mother knew of Mr. Wilson’s injuries, thus negating 
                                                                                                                                            
because it was not an affidavit nor were there “any other indicia of authenticity”), the 
document is not considered “admissible” for consideration in post-conviction appeal.   
10 When asked by the prosecutor, “[i]s there anything that you told us today that’s not 
true?” she responded “[n]o, I don’t – no.  I don’t remember – I don’t – I don’t know.”  
(Trial Tr., p.336, Ls.11-14.)  When asked by defense counsel whether she had lied that 
day, she responded “I don’t think so.”  (Trial Tr., p.348, Ls.13-16.) 
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the claim that defense counsel did nothing with this information.  (R., p.82.)  The State 
asserted that the medical, driving, and employment records were incomplete and 
speculative and would not have successfully rebutted the State’s case or changed the 
outcome.  (R., pp.82-83.)   
In support of his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 
evidence of his employment, driving, and medical records, Mr. Wilson submitted 
evidence that his regular driver’s license as well as his commercial driver’s license were 
suspended for considerable periods of time.  (R., pp.65-67.)  Further, Mr. Wilson had 
physical problems with his ankle, and was even on crutches for a period of time.  
(R., pp.69-73.)     
At the hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court 
provided its rationale regarding whether the testimony and evidence of Mr. Wilson’s 
inability to drive established an issue of material fact.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, 
L.12.)  Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction counsel attempted to clarify that the evidence 
showed that Mr. Wilson originally injured his Achilles in October of 2005 but did not 
have surgery until 2006.  (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-20, p.13, Ls.3-11.)   
Thereafter, the district court summarized the medical records as, “on April 16th, 
2006, he was in a knee splint, used crutches, no weight bearing.  And then January 22, 
2007, sprained ankle, crutches till comfortable to engage in normal activities.  Did I miss 
something?”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.)  The district court noted that “we don’t 
have anything that indicates for all of 2006 and all of 2007 he was medically prohibited 
from driving.  And similarly, we don’t have any driving record that indicates he was 
prohibited from driving all of 2006 and all of 2007.”  (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.)  
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However, Mr. Wilson did not have to establish that he was physically unable to 
drive for the entire two-year time period, it would have been sufficient for his counsel to 
impeach the witnesses using such information, in order to place further doubt in the 
jurors’ minds.  This was already a jury that used a considerable period of time 
deliberating on his guilt.  (Trial Tr., p.467, Ls.4-6.)  It took the jury nearly three hours to 
reach a verdict.  (R.39073, p.447.)   
 At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Wilson needed to show there existed a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient conduct “so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.”  Strickland, at 686.  He sufficiently 
established that he was entitled to a hearing where he substantiated his allegations with 
multiple affidavits.  Mr. Wilson had to establish that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether his counsel was deficient and if so, whether there was a 
reasonable probability that, but for the deficient conduct, the result of the trial would 
have been different.   Thus, the district court’s dismissal of all of Mr. Wilson’s claims 
was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of 
his post-conviction petition with respect to the issues of whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate/agreeing to join the two cases and for failing to call 
witnesses and introduce evidence at trial, and remand the case to the district court for 
an evidentiary hearing on these issues.   
 DATED this 9th day of May, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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